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Abstract  
 
In this historical review we chart the progress of intuition research over the past 
eight decades. We highlight the distinction between intuition research in management 
and intuition research in base disciplines and related fields, and offer a critical 
commentary on the ways in which the dynamic between these two historical threads 
has affected progress in the study of intuition in organizations. We conclude by 
identifying several promising new directions for intuition research, and offer a 
number of recommendations to intuition researchers in management which may help 
in taking this topic forward in ways that do not recapitulate previous errors, diversions 
or digressions. 
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Introduction 
Management researchers over the course of the past eight decades have been 
concerned greatly with the relationships between human beings’ information 
processing capacities and the complexities, dynamism, and uncertainties that 
characterise managerial work.  A perennial theme in these debates has been the 
question of how human rationality, which is by nature bounded, can be deployed to 
deal efficiently and effectively with the ambiguous and time-pressured decisions and 
problems that are common in managerial work.  Intuition is amongst the hardiest of 
bounded rationality’s perennials, appearing and re-appearing in various guises from 
the 1930s to the present day.  In this article we chronicle the development of intuition 
research in management, and illustrate parallel insights in related fields of scientific 
inquiry (i.e. behavioural, biological, and brain sciences), discoveries which have 
availed management scholars of conceptual, theoretical, and methodological resources 
which have been utilised to greater and lesser extents during the study of intuition in 
management.  This historical review maps in chronological sequence the key 
developments (see Figure 1).  We reflect upon how lessons from the history of 
intuition research in management may illuminate the way forward.  We begin not with 
the discoveries of a scientist but of a practitioner; our story ends with a consideration 
of emerging insights not from management and organisation studies but from 
cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary biology. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Chester Barnard and the ‘Incessant Din of Reasons’ (1930s ff.) 
In spite of the fact that as early as 1916 George van Ness Dearborn in the 
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Psychological Review declared the concept of intuition to be “a live one and real, 
worthy therefore of at least brief scientific discussion” (p.465), and notwithstanding 
the contemporaneous insights of C.G. Jung (as manifested in the iNtuiting-Sensing 
dimension of Jungian psychological types), a lone figure dominates the landscape of 
the early days of management intuition scholarship - Chester Irving Barnard (1886-
1961).  Barnard worked for nearly 40 years in the American Telegraph and Telephone 
(AT&T) Company, starting out in the statistical department and rising to the 
presidency of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company.  He was one of the first 
management writers to attempt to articulate what intuition is, to speculate on its nature 
and origins, and on the circumstances and particular job roles to which it is relevant. 
In the Cyrus Fogg Brackett lecture to the Engineering faculty and students of 
Princeton University on the 10th of March 1936 in a talk entitled ‘The Mind in 
Everyday Affairs’ (reproduced as the Appendix to his book The Functions of the 
Executive, 1938) Barnard declared that mental processes fall into two distinct 
categories: ‘non-logical’ and ‘logical’.  These are not clearly separated but meld into 
each other: 
“By ‘logical processes’ I mean conscious thinking which could be 
expressed in words, or other symbols, that is, reasoning.  By ‘non-logical 
processes’ I mean those not capable of being expressed in words or as 
reasoning, which are only made known by a judgment, decision or action.” 
(Barnard, 1938, p.302) 
For Barnard the most significant difference between individuals and between 
the various types of work that they do lies in the degree to which ‘thinking’, in the 
sense of analytical reasoning, is used or required.  He argued that executives, as 
contrasted with scientists for example, do not often enjoy the luxury of making their 
decisions on the basis of ordered and leisurely rational analyses, but depend to a large 
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extent on intuitive responses to situations requiring fast decision taking and complex 
judgements.  But like all human beings managers are nonetheless subject to one of the 
most deep-seated of human necessities – the need for expressing reasons to the extent 
that these become an “incessant din” (p.305), in spite of the fact that “much reasoning 
and much talking is loose, incorrect, and bad” (p.304). 
Barnard’s conceptualisation of intuition is naïve in that he did not provide a set 
of formal scientific criteria for distinguishing between ‘logical’ and ‘non-logical’: 
“Some of it is so unexplainable that we call it ‘intuition’.  A great deal of it passes 
under the name of ‘good judgment’” (Barnard, 1938, p.305).  Barnard did not regard 
non-logical processes as mystical (cf. Wild, 1938); on the contrary, he felt they were 
grounded chiefly in knowledge and experience, and their sources lay in physiological 
conditions or factors, or in the physical and social environment: 
“...mostly impressed upon us unconsciously or without conscious effort on 
our part.  Because they are so complex and so rapid, often approaching the 
instantaneous, these processes cannot be analyzed by the person within 
whose brain they take place consisting, as they do, of a mass of patterns, 
concepts, techniques, and abstractions that increase in number and 
complexity with directed experience, study and education” (Barnard, 
1938). 
Barnard’s contribution lies in the fact that as a practising executive he not only 
observed with great acuity and at first-hand the issues of which he wrote, but also 
thought about them deeply and insightfully, and without a scientific framework in 
which they could be placed. 
There was a psychology of which Barnard appears to have been, and as a non-
academic may be excused for being, unaware: for example in his compatriot William 
James’ (1842-1910) writings (e.g. the ‘automization’ of mental functions, 1890), but 
perhaps most notably in C.G. Jung (1875-1961) who delineated a number of psychic 
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functions including sensing, thinking, feeling, and intuiting “which I hold to be 
perception by way of the unconscious, or the perception of an unconscious content” 
(Jung, 1928, p.34) and which “should permit us to divine the more or less hidden 
possibilities and backgrounds of a situation, since these hidden factors also belong to 
a complete picture of a given moment” (Jung, 1928, p.35, emphases added) (see 
Denhardt and Dugan (1978) for a comparison of Barnard and Jung in the context of 
managerial intuition).  As later developments would demonstrate, Barnard’s ideas 
were not only compatible with some of the psychologies of the time, they anticipated 
by several decades Polanyi’s (1958) and Reber’s (1969) theories of tacit forms of 
knowledge, and implicit learning respectively, as well perhaps as containing 
intimations of automatic-versus-controlled processing.  For Barnard experience-based 
observations and a-theoretic interpretations of how managers, such as he, processed 
information reflected self-evident attributes of human cognition. 
Herbert Simon and Bounded Rationality (1950s ff.) 
Herbert A. Simon (1916-2001) was the first scholar to analyse intuition’s role in 
management and organisation in a systematic and scientific way and elevate 
understandings of it beyond Barnard’s lucid but limited account.  There is continuity 
between these two pioneers of intuition research to the extent that not only did 
Barnard write the preface to the original 1945 edition of Simon’s magnum opus 
Administrative Behavior, Simon himself also later acknowledged Barnard’s essay The 
Mind in Everyday Affairs as providing a “persuasive account” of executives’ decision 
processes (Simon, 1987, p.56).  Simon saw the task of behavioural models of rational 
choice as being to replace the global rationality of ‘economic man’ (Homo 
economicus), “with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access to 
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information and the computational capacities” which human beings are endowed with 
by nature (Simon, 1955, p.99).  The logical consequence of this position is that human 
behaviour in the environment of business organisations is “intendedly” but not wholly 
rational, i.e. organisational behaviour is “boundedly” rational (Simon, 1947 when it 
first appeared in print, Jones, 1999).  Choices are made that are satisfactory, i.e. good 
enough and actors ‘satisfice’ because the computational demands of maximising are 
beyond their computational capabilities: “The central nervous system is a serial 
information processor that must serve an organism endowed with multiple needs” 
(Simon, 1967, p.29). 
By substituting an ‘administrative man’ of limited knowledge and ability for the 
perfectly rational Homo economicus of unlimited knowledge and omnipotent 
capabilities (see Gigerenzer, 2001) it becomes possible to explain “many of the 
phenomena of organizational behavior” and provide the basis for a behavioural theory 
of decision making in organisational contexts (Simon, 1955, p.114).  In later empirical 
work Simon and his colleague William Chase conducted a series of experiments 
involving chess experts that explored the cognitive basis of intuitive judgements, and 
led ultimately to the development of a pattern-recognition based theory of intuition.  
Simon argued that the term ‘intuition’ may be used to describe decision making 
behaviour that is speedy and for which the expert is unable to describe in detail the 
reasoning, or other processes that produced the answer.  For Simon intuition is 
“nothing more and nothing less than recognition” (Simon, 1992, p.155), “analyses 
frozen into habit and the capacity for rapid response through recognition” (Simon, 
1987, p.63), and managers’ intuitive skills depend on the same kinds of mechanisms 
as those of chess masters or physicians and “it would be surprising if it were 
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otherwise” (Simon, 1997, p.136). 
Simon’s account of intuition as domain-specific expertise resonates with later 
theories of intuition in which pattern-recognition plays a preeminent role (e.g. Klein 
1998).  In this view, intuition is an outcome of an expert’s rapid recognition of, and 
response to, situations characterised by familiar cues, the latter giving access to large 
bodies of explicit and tacit knowledge assembled through learning and experience 
(Simon, 1983) stored in long term memory.  In terms of the processing mechanisms - 
and bear in mind he was writing over half a century ago - Simon did not “rule out the 
possibility that the unconscious [mind] is a better decision maker than the conscious 
[mind]” (1955, p.104).  This view resonates with Dijksterhuis’s ‘unconscious thought 
theory’ in which he posits that “contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not always 
advantageous to engage in thorough deliberation before choosing” and that 
‘unconscious thought’ has its own “generative power” (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, 
and van Baaren, 2006, p.1005). 
Simon’s account of intuition is not unproblematic.  Gobet and Chassy (2009, 
p.158) for example pointed out a number of important limitations: (1) they re-iterate 
De Groot’s (1986) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ (1986) critiques that intuition is more 
than pattern-recognition; it has constructive and productive aspects which mean that it 
not only reproduces “previous solutions, but also creatively combines elements to 
produce new solutions”, without this there is little room in Simon’s theory for a 
creative intuition.  Indeed, Simon asserted that it is possible to construct a normative 
theory of creative discovery processes “which need not be attributed to chance, 
irrationality, or creative intuition” (Simon, 1974, p.479, emphases added); (2) in spite 
of the fact that Simon (1987) addressed explicitly the issue of emotion in decision 
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making, “the links between intuition and emotions are not spelled out in any detail” in 
Simon’s account (Gobet and Chassy, 2009), nor does he explain the difference 
between emotional feelings (which he depicts largely as negative in his 1987 article) 
and intuitive feelings (cf. Damasio, 1999).  Both Barnard and Simon saw intuitive 
judgement as possessed of certain positive features (e.g. speed of response) that 
rendered it a desirable attribute of the practising manager (e.g. with experience it was 
likely to be more right than wrong). 
In recognition of his pioneering research into decision-making processes in 
organisations, Herbert A. Simon was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1978. 
Kahneman and Tversky and the ‘Down Side’ of Intuitive Judgement (1970s ff.) 
The roots of behavioural decision theory (BDT) include Simon’s treatises on 
bounded rationality in the late 1940s and 1950s, and Meehl’s work on the 
inaccuracies of expert clinical prediction (Meehl, 1954).  The main development of 
BDT came about as a result of the collaboration between Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky (Shapira, 2008).  In the late 1960s and early 1970s Kahneman (b. 1934) and 
Tversky (1937-1996) explored the systematic biases accruing from judgements and 
choices based on intuitive errors which stem from a number of fallacies and mis-
computations inherent in human information processing (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1973; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  In the ‘heuristics and biases’ research 
programme Kahneman and Tversky defined intuition as “thoughts and preferences 
that come to mind quickly and without much reflection” (Kahneman, 2002, p.449).  
Their research was guided by the notion that intuitive judgements are ‘natural 
assessments’ elicited by the task at hand (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002) and occupy a 
position between the automatic operations of perception and the deliberate operations 
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of reasoning (for an overview and critical assessment of BDT see Shapira, 2008). 
Although Tversky and Kahneman asserted that heuristics sometimes succeed 
and sometimes fail, their experimental results were typically interpreted as indicating 
human computational deficiencies (i.e. the ‘down-side’ of certain forms of bounded 
rationality - see Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 2002) attributable generally to one of three 
main heuristics that underlie judgements under conditions of uncertainty: (1) 
representativeness heuristic (i.e. ‘what is typical’); (2) availability heuristic (i.e. ‘what 
comes easily to mind’); (3) adjustment and anchoring (i.e. ‘what happens to come 
first’) (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman, 2002, 2003).  Their seminal 
work revolutionised research on judgement and decision making, and their influence 
quickly spread beyond psychology into fields as diverse as medicine, politics, law, 
economics, and business administration (Gilovich and Griffin, 2002, p.1).  The utility 
of heuristics, the ubiquity of their occurrence, and their attendant errors and biases 
have been demonstrated in the amassed body of evidence demonstrating that decision 
makers employ rules of thumb intentionally and unintentionally, consciously and non-
consciously, “in order to render the world manageable” (Hodgkinson and Sparrow, 
2002, p.15). 
From the perspective of a history of intuition in management, several aspects of 
the heuristics and biases programme as originally conceived by Kahneman and 
Tversky and their co-researchers are noteworthy: (1) heuristics are neither irrational 
nor a-rational; rather, they are natural assessments and “sensible estimation 
procedures”, based on sophisticated underlying processes (e.g. retrieval and matching) 
in response to simple questions rather than to complex judgemental problems 
(Gilovich and Griffin, 2002, p.3); (2) although the label ‘intuition’ was applied to 
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these judgements, the intuitive judgements to which they pertain are ‘cold’, i.e. affect 
is absent from the original three general-purpose heuristics (i.e. availability, 
representativeness, and anchoring and adjustment), as it was in Simon’s account of 
intuition also.  This limitation was acknowledged by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) 
thus: “the failure to identify [the affect heuristic] earlier reflects the narrowly 
cognitive focus that characterized psychology for some decades” (p.56).  Gilovich and 
Griffin (2002) are keen to point out that in the heuristics and biases programme 
decision makers are seen usually through a ‘cognitive miser’ lens (i.e. humans as 
conservators of mental effort), a view which led to dissatisfaction amongst some 
decision researchers. Gilovich and Griffin also maintain that dual-process theory (see 
below) is more consistent with the ‘natural assessments’ view, and that the latter 
rather should be considered the prime focus and consolidated as being “what the 
heuristics and biases program is really about” (2002, p.16). 
In recognition of his contribution for having integrated insights from 
psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human 
judgement and decision-making under uncertainty, Daniel Kahneman was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. 
Birth of a Management ‘Neuromyth’ (1970s ff.) 
At around the same time as Kahneman and Tversky were conducting their 
ground-breaking psychology laboratory studies of heuristics and biases, in the biology 
laboratories of Caltech and various other institutions in the USA a group of psycho-
biologists, foremost amongst whom was Roger W. Sperry (1913-1994), were studying 
the effects of severing the corpus callosum (the bundle of nerves which connects the 
two hemispheres of the brain) as a way to treat epileptic seizures.  Sperry, with 
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various colleagues including Phillip Vogel, Joseph Bogun, and Michael Gazzaniga, 
conducted a series of experiments that demonstrated clear functional specialisation of 
the brain’s two hemispheres. 
Much has been written on this subject (see Springer and Deutsch, 2001), for our 
purposes it is sufficient to note that Gazzaniga (2002) summarised the different 
aspects of thought and action that each hemisphere is responsible for as follows: (1) 
the ‘left-brain’ is dominant for language and speech (it ‘can talk’), it can also solve 
problems, and is always ‘hard at work’ seeking meaning in events.  It looks for order 
and for reason even if there is none to be found and as a result it tends to over-
generalise; (2) the ‘right-brain', while it cannot ‘talk’ and is deficient at rational 
problem solving, it is dominant in visual motor tasks and ‘lives in the present’, and 
unlike the left brain, which tends to confabulate, the right brain tends to give a much 
more truthful account of experiences. 
In recognition of his discoveries concerning the functional specialisation of the 
cerebral hemispheres, Roger W. Sperry was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine in 19811. 
As early as the mid-1970s these concepts were adapted and elaborated on by 
management researchers, most famously by Henry Mintzberg who, in drawing 
attention to his view that management was much as ‘art’ as ‘science’, declared that 
planning was a ‘left hemisphere’ process (i.e. logical, analytical, and verbal), 
managing was a ‘right hemisphere’ process (i.e. creative, intuitive, and imagistic), and 
“which hemisphere of one’s brain is better developed may determine whether a 
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person ought to be a planner or a manager” (Mintzberg, 1976, p.49).  This idea was 
embraced eagerly in business and management circles, for example small business 
research (Isaack, 1981), strategic decision making (Agor, 1986), and consumer 
behaviour (Kassarjian, 1982).  The left-brain/right-brain model of information 
processing gained momentum through the 1970s and 1980s.  For example Taggart 
and colleagues proposed a ‘human information processing (HIP) metaphor’ in which 
a ‘left-hemisphere’ decision style was characterised by logical, sequential, objective, 
deductive, and analytic processes, whilst a ‘right-hemisphere’ decision style was 
characterised by non-logical, simultaneous, subjective, a-causal, inductive, and 
synthetic processes, including intuition (Taggart and Valenzi, 1990). 
The influence of the ‘split-brain’ school of thought has been strong and 
pervasive to the extent that even as late as the mid-1990s the split-brain/hemispheric 
dominance concept was offered by organisational behaviour researchers as an 
explanation for individual differences in intuitive and analytical processing.  For 
example, the Cognitive Style Index (CSI) is an instrument predicated upon the split-
brain model (see Allinson and Hayes, 1996, p.122) traceable to Mintzberg’s (1976) 
Harvard Business Review article.  As we shall witness, the turn of the century saw 
major conceptual, theoretical, and methodological advances which rendered split-
brain models of decision making and associated techniques for the assessment of 
individual differences problematic to say the least.  These more recent advances 
notwithstanding, the split-brain model prevails in the popular business and 
management literature.  Ned Herrmann for example in his The whole brain business 
book: Which quadrant dominates you and your organization? offered readers a 
‘Whole Brain Technology’ based on assessment using the ‘Herrmann Brain 
Dominance Instrument (HBDI)’ and promised an improved understanding not only of 
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how the brain works, your own ‘mentality’ and that of colleagues, family members, 
and friends, but also of what “turns you on, and why you do things in the way you do 
them” (Herrmann, 1996, p.4).  Almost a decade on from Herrmann, Daniel Pink in his 
New York Times, BusinessWeek, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post best-seller 
A whole new mind: Why right-brainers will rule the future (translated into 23 
languages) challenged what he saw as the orthodoxy of reductive and analytical forms 
of thinking (referred to as ‘L[i.e. ‘left-hemisphere’]-directed’).  Pink argued that in the 
‘information/conceptual-age’ societies of the West there is an imperative to be ‘re-
animated’ by a new ‘R-directed’ frame of mind that cherishes abilities such as 
“forging relationships rather than executing transactions, tackling novel challenges 
rather than solving routine problems, and synthesizing the big picture rather than 
analyzing a single component” (Pink, 2005, p.34). 
It may come as a surprise, therefore, that a little over a decade after Mintzberg 
(1976) a number of management researchers were already expressing scepticism and 
doubts about the veracity of the application of the psycho-biologists’ findings.  Hines 
(1987), for example, reviewed current research on hemispheric differences and 
concluded that the claims of Mintzberg (1976), Agor (1986), and others represented a 
“hemisphere mythology”, and that any attempts to improve performance, training and 
selection using “such non-existent dichotomies will at best be unproductive” (p.605).  
Simon (1987) referred to the split-brain doctrine in management as a “romantic 
extrapolation” and made two salient points as far as intuition research is concerned: 
(1) physiological research does not imply that either hemisphere is capable of problem 
solving, decision making, or creative discovery independent of the other (i.e. both 
analysis and intuition are essential, a point on which Mintzberg (1976) concurred); (2) 
for the purposes of organisational behaviour “it is the differences in behavior, and not 
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the difference in hemispheres that are important…The important questions for us are 
‘what is intuition?’ and ‘how is it accomplished?’, not ‘in which cubic centimetres of 
the brain tissue does it take place?” (Simon, 1987, p.59).  Thirty years after Mintzberg 
(1976), the eminent neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga (2006, p.66) in the Harvard 
Business Review issued a timely caution regarding the implications of contemporary 
research in the behavioural neurosciences for business and management (the title of 
the article was ‘The brain as boondoggle’). 
Viewed sympathetically, the ‘spilt-brain’ idea is at best a convenient metaphor 
for two different modes of thinking.  It also sounds a cautionary note for those who 
may wish to incorporate the latest findings from the neurosciences into the field of 
management and organisation too prematurely: without due diligence they run the risk 
of creating and promulgating 21st century neuro-mythologies.  The simple left/right 
model of information processing has given way to more sophisticated 
conceptualisations of ‘neural geography’ in which intuitive and analytical approaches 
to decision making are underpinned by complex, interconnected neuropsychological 
networks and systems, hence, reference to gross left/right differences in information 
processing are “perhaps best avoided altogether” (Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, 
Claxton, and Sparrow, 2009, p.282). 
Beginnings of Systematic Description, and Normal Science (1980s ff.) 
The 1980s were a period in which a number of parallel streams of intuition 
research co-existed.  BDT entered what might be described as a period of normal 
science: psychologists gradually accumulated evidence in support of the foundational 
tenets of a paradigm (heuristics and biases) which is a central plank of classical 
behavioural decision research (see Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman, 2002; Shapira, 
 16
2008).  In management the neuro-myth persisted, but management research also 
witnessed the beginnings of a systematic investigation of intuition’s role in 
organisational decision making processes.  The efforts of Mintzberg and others 
refocused management researchers’ attention on intuition in practice; for example 
Isenberg (1984) reported 12 case studies of ‘how senior managers think’, and found 
that “the higher you go in a company the more important it is that you combine 
intuition and rationality” (p.81).  Participants appeared to use intuition in five distinct 
ways: (1) sensing when a problem exists; (2) performing well-learned behaviours 
rapidly; (3) integrating and synthesising data; (4) checking on the results of rational 
analysis; (5) coming to plausible decisions quickly by by-passing in-depth analysis.  
Agor (1986) surveyed 200 ‘highly intuitive’ managers with 11 open-ended questions 
on issues related to use of intuition.  He found that the conditions under which 
intuition ‘functioned best’ included: (1) uncertainty; (2) absence of precedent; (3) 
requirement to use limited or ambiguous data and information; (4) existence of 
equally plausible alternatives; (5) time pressure.  Notwithstanding these achievements 
in descriptive research, the 1980s became a period of stasis as far as theoretical 
understandings of the processes and mechanisms of management intuition were 
concerned.  In the decade that followed, three scientific developments occurred 
outside of the management field, but the impact of which on intuition research in 
management is hard to overestimate. 
Three Pillars of Modern Intuition Research (1990s ff.) 
Dual–Process Theories 
In their recent review of theory and research directed more broadly to the 
analysis of cognition in organisations Hodgkinson and Healey (2008) noted that both 
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heuristics and biases and intuition research received an impetus from dual-process 
theories of cognition.  Dual-process theories of reasoning and decision making 
constitute an extensive domain of inquiry and comprehensive reviews are to be found 
in Chaiken and Trope (1999), Stanovich and West (2000), and Evans (2008).  Dual-
process theories - summarised cogently by Evans (2003, p.454) as essentially positing 
“two minds in one brain” - come in a number of forms and have in common the 
notion that there are two contrasting modes (systems) of information processing: 
System 1 processes are contextually-dependent, automatic, largely unconscious, 
associative, intuitive, implicit, and fast; System 2 processes are contextually-
independent, analytic, rule-based, explicit, and relatively slow (Stanovich and West, 
2000). 
Among the many dual-process theories Epstein’s Cognitive-Experiential Self-
Theory (CEST) (Epstein, 1985, 1994), which posits a ‘rational (i.e. analytical) 
system’ and an ‘experiential (i.e. intuitive) system’ (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and 
Heier, 1996; Epstein, 2008), is especially pertinent to intuition research because of the 
primacy that it accords to affect (i.e. ‘gut feel’, ‘hunch’, ‘vibe’, etc.).  According to 
CEST when a person responds to an emotionally significant event, the experiential 
(intuitive) system automatically searches its memory banks for related events, 
including their emotional accompaniments.  Although the terms ‘intuition’ and ‘gut 
feel’ are not explicitly used in CEST (‘experiential’ and ‘vibes’ are preferred terms), 
Epstein (2008, p.29) argued that everything discussed about the experiential system is 
relevant to intuition because intuition is regarded as a subset of experiential 
processing. 
CEST has come to enjoy considerable prominence amongst management 
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intuition researchers in the 2000s (e.g. Hodgkinson and Clarke, 2007; Hodgkinson et 
al, 2009; Leybourne and Sadler-Smith, 2006; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005).  There 
are several likely reasons for this: (1) availability and ease-of-scoring of Epstein et 
al’s Rational Experiential Inventory (REI), an instrument for assessing individual 
differences in preferred approaches to information processing based on independent 
rationality (‘need for cognition’) and experientiality (‘faith in intuition’) scales; (2) 
CEST formed the theoretical basis of Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith’s (2003) critique 
of Allinson and Hayes’ (1996) CSI; (3) the affective component of intuitive 
judgement aligns closely to Epstein’s conception of the intuition construct.  Indeed, 
Epstein has gone as far as to claim that the most, if not all, of the attributes of intuition 
“can be accounted for by the operation of the experiential system” (Epstein, 2008, 
p.33). 
The Somatic-Marker Hypothesis 
The small number of behavioural decision researchers who did acknowledge the 
role of affect in human judgement and decision making (e.g. Simon, 1987) lacked an 
explanation of the mechanisms whereby affect is infused into the decision making 
process.  Given that affect is a psychological function associated with a number of 
specific neural systems, the proper level of analysis for such a function is “the level at 
which that function is represented in the brain” (Le Doux, 1996, p.16).  In pursuit of 
this level of explanation for affect’s role in decision making neurologists Antonio 
Damasio, Antoine Bechara, and colleagues studied several patients with lesions of the 
ventro-medial pre-frontal cortex (VMPC) who “showed impairments in judgment and 
decision making in real-life settings, in spite of maintaining normal intellect” (p.337).  
Following the lead of earlier work (Eslinger and Damasio, 1985) involving the study 
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of modern clinical cases similar to the famous ‘frontal lobe syndrome’ suffered by 
19th century railway worker Phineas Gage, Damasio and colleagues formulated the 
somatic marker hypothesis (SMH). 
Damasio and his co-researchers (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 
1997) compared the performance in an experiment based on a high-risk gambling task 
of normal participants and patients with damage to the VMPC, the brain region that 
Gage had suffered damage to, which was thought to be involved in infusing emotion 
in the decision process (these were the so-called ‘Iowa Gambling Task’, IGT, 
studies).  Damasio and colleagues’ research programme offered strong evidence that 
when the VMPC is intact autonomic responses associated with intuitions based upon 
previous experience and emotional states guide decision making and outcomes in 
advance of awareness and influence higher-order thinking processes both consciously 
and unconsciously: this is the essence of the SMH.  For a critical review of the SMH 
see Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence (2006). 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
Pioneering NDM researcher Gary Klein described himself and his colleagues as 
‘naturalists’ whose investigations are concerned with how people actually make 
decisions in field settings rather than investigations that test “hypotheses drawn from 
mathematical and statistical theories” (1998, p.291) thus intimating dissatisfaction 
with mainstream BDT.  Klein and his colleagues investigated the strategies used by 
experienced professionals when performing complex, ill-structured, high-stakes tasks, 
in time-pressured, uncertain and dynamic conditions (Zsambok and Klein, 1997).  The 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model describes what professionals such as fire-
fighters, nurses, or military commanders actually do under conditions of time 
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pressure, ambiguity, and changing conditions.  RPD postulates that under such 
conditions experts can make good decisions without having to consciously perform 
extensive, multi-attribute analyses and that they are able to do so by employing their 
experience to recognise problems as similar to problems previously encountered, or 
which are at least similar to problems they have met before. 
Klein argued that intuition depends on the use of experience to recognise key 
patterns that indicate the dynamics of the situation.  Because the patterns encountered 
in real-life situations can be nuanced and subtle, people often cannot describe what 
they actually noticed, or how they judged a situation as typical or atypical.  Klein is 
keen to point out that intuition is not infallible and our experience can mislead us; 
hence, we may make errors of judgement.  However, such experience has the 
potential to add to our knowledge and skills base (both tacit and explicit), thereby 
contributing to the on-going acquisition of expertise.  Whilst RPD offers a convincing 
account of intuitive judgement Klein only offered the merest of glimpses of the 
significance of affect in RPD (“sometimes…we just ‘feel’ the problem, an emotional 
sense that something is not right”, 2003, p.96).  He alluded to, but did not elaborate 
on, the potential of somatic-markers as an explanation of this phenomenon. 
Management Intuition Research in the 1990s: Description and Prescription 
The 1990s witnessed a continuation of the general tendency among 
management researchers of not engaging with the substantive theoretical advances 
taking place in the base disciplines.  Instead, management researchers were concerned 
with asking questions about the role of intuition in managing modern organisations 
and, on the basis of their findings, offering prescriptive advice about when it should 
and should not be used based on an impoverished understanding of the scientific basis 
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of intuitive cognition. 
Parikh, Neubauer, and Lank (1994) conducted a cross-sectional survey of 
managers across nine countries covering issues relating to ‘what is intuition?’, ‘how 
relevant is intuition?’, ‘how can intuition be identified?’, and ‘when is intuition used?’  
The detailed findings, published in the monograph by Parikh and his colleagues are 
for the most part descriptive and lack any substantive theoretical insights.  In similar 
vein, at the end of the decade Burke and Miller (1999) conducted interviews with 60 
experienced professionals holding significant positions in major organisations across 
the USA.  They explored the nature of intuition, how it is developed, how often it is 
used, and the type of workplace situations in which intuition is deployed.  Based on 
their findings Burke and Miller provided a picture of intuition-in-use and offered 
advice to executives on when intuition should be used, i.e. when time is of the 
essence, when explicit cues or guidance are lacking, when uncertainty prevails, and 
when it is necessary to run a check-and-balance on quantitative analyses. 
By the end of the 1990s intuition research as it applied to the mainstream of 
management and organisation had come full circle, re-iterating, confirming, or 
extending a number of the insights offered by Barnard over half a century earlier (e.g. 
what intuition is, its nature and origins, and the circumstances and job roles to which 
it is relevant).  The studies by Parikh et al (1994) and Burke and Miller (1999) 
represent something of a watershed in management intuition research.  With the 
advent of the new millennium, the practical relevance of intuition was beyond doubt 
(managers used it, and were interested in finding out how to use it more effectively), 
and the stage was set for intuition researchers in our field to proceed with a more 
rigorous programme of inquiry; however, from a theoretical standpoint the ‘loose end’ 
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of affect’s place in BDT and NDM was as yet unresolved. 
Heuristics and Biases Revisited: Making Sense of ‘Gut Feel’ (2000 ff.) 
The turn of the millennium for BDT witnessed not only recognition of the role 
that affect plays in decision making in general and in intuitive judgement in particular, 
but also a systematic attempt to account for its role by utilising concepts that had 
emerged only several years earlier in neurology (i.e. the SMH) and combine these 
with relevant insights from dual-process theory.  As Hodgkinson and Healey (in 
press) have observed: (1) earlier variants of dual-process theory reinforced the 
cognitive miser notion (cf. Gilovich and Griffin, 2002, p.5); (2) more recent 
developments suggest that an automatic and affective reflexive or X-system 
“underpins” the controlled operations of a reflective system responsible for higher 
forms of cognition such as logical reasoning, planning and hypothetical thinking 
(Lieberman, 2007). 
Clearly one of the limitations not only of Simon’s theory (e.g. Simon, 1987), but 
also of RPD (Klein, 1998), classical heuristics and biases programme, and BDT more 
generally was a failure to recognise or account for the role of automaticity and affect 
in intuitive judgement.  Notwithstanding the fact that biologists (e.g. Le Doux, 1996) 
and psychologists (e.g. Zajonc, 1980) had long-recognised the significance of affect 
for human behaviour and choice (see Oatley, 2004 for a historical review), both 
bounded rationality and the heuristics and biases programme from their inception to 
the mid ‘90s emphasised cognition over affect, as had RPD from its inception (even 
though the role of feeling states was, according to Hodgkinson and Healey (in press), 
“well-appreciated” in Janis and Mann (1977) but subsequently overlooked).  This is 
unsurprising since in the tradition of judgement and decision research there has been 
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the long-held view that decision making is a purely rational and cognitive process 
(Hastie and Dawes, 2001, p.206).  It was not until the late-‘90s that the distinctive role 
played by affect began to be explained satisfactorily by BDT researchers and studied 
by them in decision making processes (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor, 
2002).  A reliance on feelings to guide judgement is referred to by some researchers 
as an ‘affect heuristic’ (as conceptualised by Slovic and his colleagues).  This 
represented an explicit acknowledgement by heuristics and biases researchers of 
affect in their theory.  For a review of the empirical evidence relating to the affect 
heuristic, see Slovic et al (2002). 
One of the notable strengths of Slovic’s work (Slovic et al, 2004) is the 
theoretical connections noted between the affect heuristic and dual-process theories, 
and Epstein’s CEST in particular (the rational system which Slovic and colleagues 
prefer to label as the ‘analytic’ system on the grounds that there are “strong elements 
of rationality in both [i.e. experiential and rational] systems”, p.313).  Slovic and 
colleagues appealed simultaneously to both the SMH and CEST: firstly, they consider 
Bechara and Damasio’s SMH as the most comprehensive theoretical account of the 
role of affect in decision making; secondly, they regard the affect heuristic “as the 
centrepiece of the experiential mode of thinking” (p.319, emphasis added), and which 
was most likely the dominant mode of risk assessment and survival throughout most 
of the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens.  In Slovic and colleagues’ theorising of 
the affect heuristic we witness much-needed cross-fertilisation, integration, and 
synthesis within and across the various fields that have shed light upon the 
fundamentals of intuition. 
A ‘New Wave’ of Intuition Research in Management (2000s ff.) 
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The fundamental conceptual and theoretical developments in the psychological 
and biological sciences that were necessary to build an integrative understanding of 
intuition’s role in organisational behaviour were themselves not consolidated until the 
1990s.  Therefore at the beginning of the new millennium management researchers 
were fortunate to have the pragmatic rationale (e.g. Burke and Miller, 1999; Parikh et 
al, 1994) and the conceptual and theoretical resources (i.e. Damasio, 1994; Epstein, 
1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000; Klein, 1998) to enable them to 
embark on a more scientifically rigorous programme of intuition research and 
scholarship based on empirical and theoretical work. 
Selective Review of Empirical Studies 
The empirically-based developments witnessed in the early 2000s drew on 
insights from BDT and dual-process theories, and went beyond the reporting of 
frequencies and percents that characterised the descriptive and prescriptive work of 
the 1990s.  Several groups of researchers in the USA, Europe, and beyond chose 
instead to deploy multivariate statistical techniques in medium- to large-sample cross-
sectional studies to examine relationships between intuition and behaviour and 
performance, as well as pursuing construct validation issues. 
One of the first significant studies of this type was that of Khatri and Ng (2000) 
who compared the use of intuition in strategic decision making across three industry 
types (type was a proxy for environment instability).  Khatri and Ng’s (2000) 
justification for their research was that “although intuitive processes are critical for 
effective strategic decision making, there is little in the way of applied research on the 
topic [and] only a handful of serious scholarly works on the subject” (p.57).  Other 
cross-sectional studies have examined the relationships between intuition and 
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performance in a variety of areas of business, for example small firm performance 
(e.g. Sadler-Smith, 2004), strategic decision preferences (Hough and ogilvie, 2005), 
project management (Leybourne and Sadler-Smith, 2006), performance in non-profit 
organisations (Ritchie, Kolodinsky and Eastwood, 2007), and strategic decision 
effectiveness (Elbanna and Child, 2007).  By incorporating insights from dual-process 
theory researchers also were able, on theoretical grounds, to challenge the orthodoxy 
of the unitary (‘split-brain’) position as it applied to individual differences in 
managers’ information processing (i.e. cognitive) styles (see Hodgkinson and Sadler-
Smith, 2003; Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Sinclair, and Ashkanasy, 2009). 
More recently researchers have augmented hypothetico-deductive inquiry with 
other approaches in order to capture subjective experiences and retrospective accounts 
of intuition using inductively-driven methods.  For example, on the basis of 
interviews with 14 loan officers in a large Israeli commercial bank Lipshitz and 
Shulimovitz (2007) found that in rating the credibility of loan applicants, loan officers 
integrated ‘hard’ financial data with ‘soft’ impressions and gut feelings, but regarded 
feelings as more valid indicators of applicants’ credit worthiness than they did 
relevant financial data.  Woiceshyn (2009) studied how 19 oil company CEOs 
managed complex situations; she referred to interplay between intuition and rational 
analysis as a three-loop ‘spiralling’ process (zooming-out/zooming-in; analysis-by-
principles; testing the tentative decision).  Hensman and Sadler-Smith (2011) used in-
depth semi-structured interviews with 15 highly-experienced banking executives to 
study intuitive decision making in the finance sector.  They found that reliance on 
intuition was related not only to the nature of the task (e.g. factors of time and 
uncertainty) and individual factors (e.g. participants’ experience and confidence), but 
also organisational contextual factors (e.g. constraints and conventions, accountability 
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and hierarchy, team dynamics and organisational culture).  These recent qualitative 
studies are welcome; however, the processes of intuiting and associated intuitive 
outcomes present unique challenges and opportunities to intuition researchers wishing 
to ‘capture’ intuitions.  The potential of the full range of methods has yet to be 
exploited (e.g. psycho-phenomenology, Critical Incident Technique, Experience 
Sampling Methods, and Day Reconstruction Method), and readers are referred to 
Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2011) for a critical review of methods available for 
investigating intuition. 
Selective Review of Conceptual and Theoretical Work 
The 2000s have also witnessed a significant number of conceptual and 
theoretical advances which have built on the foundational work in BDT and NDM 
described above.  Building on the work of Hogarth (2001) and others, and in an initial 
attempt at a conceptual synthesis of NDM and SMH, Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) 
drew attention to the affective (‘intuition-as-affect’) and cognitive (‘intuition-as-
expertise’) facets of intuition, and used this as a basis for recommendations to 
executives on how to make more effective use of intuition and develop better intuitive 
judgement skills.  In parallel with these developments Sinclair and Ashkanasy (2005) 
defined intuition as a non-sequential information processing mode, which comprises 
both cognitive and affective elements, resulting in direct knowing without any use of 
conscious reasoning.  Sinclair and Ashkanasy’s contribution is significant for two 
reasons: (1) they used the extant literature to build an integrative model of analytical 
and intuitive decision making, which combined characteristics of the problem at hand, 
decision makers’ dispositions, decision context, the decision itself, and conscious 
analytical and non-conscious intuitive processes, with affect and gender as 
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moderating variables; (2) they (re-)introduced a “supra-consciousness” element in 
their discussions, suggestive of a transpersonal intuition, which they “reserved for 
unknown processes” (p.360, emphasis added), thereby reprising the mystical, Jungian 
and spiritual perspectives that earlier writers had adopted (for example Vaughan, 
1979, mooted a ‘spiritual intuition’). 
The tenor of Sadler-Smith and Shefy (2004) was largely sympathetic towards 
the utility of intuitive judgement (i.e. they offered an advocacy for ‘informed’, i.e. 
expertise-based, intuition), whilst that of Sinclair and Ashkanasy was mixed (the title 
of their article was ‘Intuition: Myth or decision making tool?’).  A more sceptical tone 
was also adopted by Miller and Ireland (2005) who, although acknowledging that 
many executives and managers embrace intuition as a viable and sometimes effective 
approach, concluded that it is a “troublesome decision tool” (p.21).  They 
distinguished between ‘holistic hunch’ (the underlying processes which are not “well 
understood” (p.21) but are valuable when firms are emphasising exploration) and 
‘automated expertise’ (recognition of familiar situations and the straight-forward but 
partially sub-conscious application of previous learning) (cf. Crossan, Lane, and 
White, 1999).  Miller and Ireland advocated that managers should: (1) exercise 
caution and only deploy holistic hunches when the costs of failure can be absorbed 
without significantly affecting a firm’s viability; (2) rely on automated expertise when 
exploiting existing strategies and technologies (rather than when exploring), and 
where constraints of time or other resources preclude raising knowledge to an explicit 
level.  Kirton (2003, p.52) has also addressed the issue of logic and intuition with 
respect to innovation, arguing that both adaptors and innovators need logic and 
intuition (e.g. “intuition can be very useful as a way of setting up a hypothesis but is 
unacceptable as ‘proof’”), but that they are likely to use them not only to different 
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degrees, but in qualitatively different ways. 
Although the researchers referred to above acknowledged several of the 
fundamental principles underpinning current understanding of intuition as manifest in 
BDT, NDM, and SMH none provided a comprehensive, integrated account and 
testable research propositions.  The need for such a contribution was recognised by 
Dane and Pratt (2007) who not only defined the construct in a way that has become 
widely accepted (i.e. “affectively charged judgments that arise through rapid, non-
conscious and holistic associations”, p.40), but also provided a comprehensive review 
and theorisation of intuition and its role in managerial decision making.  Dane and 
Pratt provided much-needed conceptual clarity by delineating intuition from other 
related constructs such as instinct and insight (cf. Hogarth, 2001), discriminated 
between intuiting and intuition, and developed a theoretical model and hypotheses 
that incorporated the role of domain knowledge, learning, task and environmental 
characteristics, situation awareness, and affect. 
In a review of intuition research across the behavioural sciences more generally, 
Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, and Sadler-Smith (2008) argued that although until 
comparatively recently the construct has been regarded as “scientifically weak” and 
on the “fringes” of psychology, intuition has now emerged from the shadows to 
become “legitimate subject of scientific inquiry” (p.19).  However, despite the many 
notable developments that have taken place (as summarised above) Hodgkinson et al 
(2008) saw considerable challenges ahead for researchers, not least the need to 
understand more fully the relationships between intuition’s somatic, affective, and 
cognitive components.  Although recent years have witnessed significant advances in 
the integration of concepts and models from areas such as the behavioural 
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neurosciences, dual-process theory, and NDM, there is still no fully-integrated and 
holistic theoretical picture of how the fundamental processes of intuiting interact 
within and between the physiological and psychological levels of analysis; nor, 
indeed, is it yet clear how the basic processes identified by cognitive and behavioural 
neuroscientists relate to specific aspects of organisational behaviour (see Hodgkinson 
and Healey, in press). 
New Directions 
Recent years have witnessed significant new developments in intuition research 
both from within management and organisation studies, and in base and previously 
unrelated disciplines (e.g. neuroscience and moral philosophy).  In the final section of 
our historical review a number of promising new directions will be considered. 
Dis-aggregation into Types 
Historical examination of intuition research reveals the idea of intuition as non-
unitary to be not new.  For example, Epstein et al (1996, p.403) speculated that just as 
mathematical, verbal, and abstract logic comprise rational processing (i.e. facets of 
System 2), there may also be “several experiential [intuitive] abilities, such as 
visualization, imagination, and aesthetic sensibility” (i.e. facets of System 1).  Earlier 
still, other scholars such as Wild (1938), Vaughan (1979), and Cappon (1994) also 
postulated different types of intuition. 
Dane and Pratt (2009) disaggregated intuitive outcomes systematically into 
three types based on the ‘nature of associations’, ‘intensity of affect’, and ‘level of 
incubation’, as follows: (1) problem-solving intuition is the outcome of a process of 
pattern-matching “honed through repeated training and practice” (p.5).  In essence it 
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corresponds to what Kahneman and Klein (2009) and Salas, Rosen, and 
DiazGranados (2010) referred to as ‘intuitive expertise’.  However, Dane and Pratt 
used the term problem-solving intuition to avoid conflating this type of intuition with 
one of its causes (i.e. expertise); (2) creative intuitions are “feelings that arise when 
knowledge is combined in novel ways” (p.5) based on loose problem structures 
involving integration of knowledge across different domains.  However, Dane and 
Pratt question whether creative intuition is an intuition at all because it is relatively 
slow (i.e. the outcome of incubation, and hence more closely related to insight) and 
therefore may not warrant the descriptor ‘intuition’; (3) moral intuition (see Hauser, 
2006). 
In their disaggregation of intuitive processes Glöckner and Witteman (2010) 
argued that dual-process models do not provide any differentiation within the 
categories of intuitive or deliberative processing.  They proposed a four-fold 
categorisation according to a series of underlying cognitive processes (i.e. associative 
intuition; matching intuition; accumulative intuition; constructive intuition), and 
argued that their taxonomy qualified some of the more ambiguous assumptions of 
dual-process models (e.g. that intuition operates on affective information, but it was 
not clear how).  In Glöckner and Witteman’s (2010) differentiated analysis, “affect is 
important as an input to as well as output from the different processes” (p.18, 
emphases added).  This view is consistent with Slovic et al’s (2002) model of the 
affect heuristic (i.e. affectively-tagged images already in the affect pool are inputs to 
the decision process) and Dane and Pratt’s (2007, p.40) definition of intuition as 
“affectively-charged judgments” (i.e. the affective charge is subjectively experienced 
as an output referred to generically as ‘gut feel’). 
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The extent to which Glöckner and Witteman’s analysis of intuitive processes 
maps onto related processes such as insight (see Hogarth, 2001; Jung-Beeman, 
Bowden, Haberman, Frymiare, Arambel-Lui, Greenblat, Reber, and Kounios, 2004) 
or intuitive outcomes such as the creative and moral types of intuition (Dane and 
Pratt, 2009) is not clear (note that Glöckner and Witteman’s matching intuition shares 
some of the features of Klein’s RPD model, and hence is less problematic in this 
regard).  Further research is required to explore the relationships between the 
disaggregated processes of intuiting (i.e. Glöckner and Witteman’s analysis) and 
disaggregated types of intuition (i.e. Dane and Pratt’s analysis), as well as 
relationships to the SMH (e.g. are somatic markers inputs or outputs in Glöcker and 
Witteman’s conceptualisation?) and dual-process theory more generally (e.g. how 
does the intensity (high/low) and valence (positive/negative) of an affective charge 
vary across different types of intuitive processes and outcomes?). 
The Emergence of ‘Intuitive Expertise’ 
From the perspective of ‘intuition-as-expertise’ (Hogarth, 2001; Sadler-Smith 
and Shefy, 2004) informed intuition is the result of extensive and deliberate practice, 
reflection, feedback, and analysis (Dreyfus and Dreyfus, 1986; Ericsson, Prietula, and 
Cokely, 2007).  Hence, it is not possible to understand intuition or improve decision 
makers’ intuitive judgement skills in business organisations without first 
understanding the nature of intuitive expertise and the conditions under which it is 
acquired and when it succeeds or fails (Salas et al, 2010).  Kahneman and Klein 
(2009) mapped the boundary conditions that separate intuitive expertise from 
overconfident and biased judgements.  Paralleling Kahneman and Klein (2009), Salas 
et al (2010) identified the factors that influencing the use and effectiveness of 
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intuition (i.e. level of expertise and processing styles of the decision maker; task 
structure and the availability of feedback; and the characteristics of the decision 
environment). 
The recent emergence of ‘intuitive expertise’ as a distinctive topic in its own 
right represents the conjoining of two major traditions in intuition research, namely 
NDM and heuristics and biases on the basis that professional (i.e. expert) intuition is 
“sometimes marvellous and sometimes flawed” (Kahneman and Klein, 2009, p.515).  
Although there are still major differences between the NDM and the heuristics and 
biases positions on intuition (e.g. with respect to the concept of bias) Kahneman and 
Klein (2009) have recently succeeded in bringing jointly the insights of both traditions 
to bear on the analysis of intuitive judgement.  In order to further advance intuition 
research from the expertise perspective Salas et al (2010, p.965) have called for a 
programme of empirical research in field settings that tests models of individual- and 
team-level expertise-based intuition using methods such as think-aloud protocols, 
narratives, and shadowing, in order to unpack “the black box of intuition”, as well as 
to longitudinally track evaluations designed to develop the intuitive expertise of 
individuals and teams. 
Neuroscience of Intuition 
Modern brain-imaging techniques enable brain activity to be mapped during 
specific mental activities thus allowing researchers to examine the neural bases of 
intuitive judgement and its associated processes.  For instance, in several studies 
fMRI (has been used to identify brain regions associated with insight (as distinct from 
intuition) thereby reinforcing the distinction between these two constructs (Jung-
Beeman et al, 2004).  The results of other fMRI studies resonate strongly with dual-
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process theory; for example, social cognitive neuroscientist Lieberman and his 
colleagues found that intentional explicit judgements (i.e. in domains where 
participants had low levels of experience) were associated with activation of a 
‘reflective’ system (referred to as the C-system), whilst intuition-based judgements 
(i.e. low-effort implicit judgements in areas where the participants had high 
experience) on the other hand were associated with activations in a reflexive system 
(the X-system) (Lieberman, Jarcho, and Satpute, 2004).  It is suggested by Lieberman 
(2007) that mirror neurons play an important role in non-verbal communication and 
intuitive judgements of the behaviour, intentions, and experiences of others, thereby 
allowing individuals to “use the same systems that process knowledge about self-
performed actions, self-conceived thoughts, and self-experienced emotions to 
understand actions, thoughts, and emotions in others” (Oberman and Ramachandran, 
2007, p.310).  Current work in management has begun to consider the implications of 
these developments for the psychological micro-foundations of strategic management 
theory and research, in particular, the role of reflective and reflexive processes in the 
development of dynamic capabilities (Hodgkinson and Healey, in press). 
 
Evolutionary Perspectives: The Adaptive Toolbox and Moral Intuition 
Evolutionary perspectives are a neglected but potentially fruitful avenue of 
inquiry for intuition researchers.  Dual-process theorists have speculated that System 
2 processing evolved some 50,000 to 60,000 years ago (Evans, 2003) but that System 
1 processing is much older than this, and may also be present in non-human animals 
(Epstein, 1994, 2008).  From the perspective of evolution through natural selection 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) in discussing the concept of an ‘adaptive toolbox of 
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the mind’, posed the question ‘How would a grand planner [i.e. nature] design a 
human mind?’  They responded with a model of the mind of a Homo heuristicus that 
“can make inferences quickly from a few observations…works well in a world where 
inferences have to be made from small samples, and where the future may change in 
unforeseen ways” (p.136). 
Gigerenzer and his colleagues’ ‘fast-and-frugal’ heuristics research programme 
which had its inception in the mid to late ‘90s has two main aims: (1) studying the 
heuristics that people actually use in everyday contexts and settings (i.e. their 
‘adaptive toolbox’); (2) demonstrating in which environments a given heuristic 
performs well, i.e. the ‘ecological rationality’ of particular heuristics as specialised 
tools (Hutchinson and Gigerenzer, 2005).  Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009, p.107) 
described Homo heuristicus as being in possession of a benignly biased mind that 
ignores part of the available information, but which paradoxically “can handle 
uncertainty more efficiently and robustly than an unbiased mind relying on more 
resource-intensive and general-purpose processing strategies”. 
A further area in which concepts from evolutionary biology may shed light on 
intuitive behaviour in organisations pertains to the domain of moral judgement and 
intuitive ethics.  Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model, which called into question 
conventional accounts of the rationality of moral and ethical judgement, has two 
principal attributes: (1) the model is intuitionist in that “moral judgment is generally 
the result of quick, automatic evaluations (intuitions)” (2001, p.814); (2) the model is 
social in that emphasises the significance of social and cultural influences on moral 
judgement, i.e. social intuitions are learned gradually and implicitly by observation 
and imitation (e.g. of leaders) within the custom complexes of their socio-cultural 
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setting (e.g. business organisations), with the latter providing a cultural “front end” 
for the somatic-marker hypothesis (Haidt, 2001, p.828).  Intuitive moral judgement 
involves non-conscious pattern-matching which elicits an affective response but 
without conscious awareness of the underlying cognitive and affective processes.  In 
other words, reasoning is reduced to a post hoc attribution which creates an illusion of 
control (see Dane and Pratt, 2009; Sonenschein, 2007). 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In this review we have offered our interpretation of the chronological sequence 
of events that make up the history of intuition research in management.   
Until the turn of the century, developments of note in intuition research 
occurred mainly outside the fields of management.  Within management research the 
picture was sometimes confused and contradictory: for example, there was no clear 
exposition of the now well-established distinction between insight and intuition.  One 
consequence of this conceptual confusion was that organisational learning researchers 
lacked clarity in their models, exemplified by Crossan et al’s (1999) observation that, 
“Interpreting has to do with developing intuitive insights” (p.525, emphases added).  
Moreover, the concept of intuition itself was undefined or poorly-defined.  
Systematically derived and conceptually robust definitions emerged only in the mid-
late 2000s (e.g. Dane and Pratt, 2007; Sinclair and Ashkanasy, 2005).  The spate of 
reviews that have appeared in quick succession in recent years are evidence of a 
convergence of views on what intuition is, and what it is not (e.g. Dane and Pratt, 
2007; Hodgkinson et al, 2008; Hodgkinson et al, 2009; Miller and Ireland, 2005; 
Sadler-Smith and Shefy, 2004) – to achieve this level of agreement is a major step 
forward.  These and our other historical observations lead us to offer four concluding 
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recommendations in going forward, namely: (1) the need to strive for more careful 
conceptual framing; (2) the need for greater cross-disciplinary collaboration and 
integration; (3) the need for increased methodological rigour and pluralism; and (4) 
closer attention to levels of analyses issues. 
Recommendation 1, Careful conceptual framing: We are fortunate that 
scientific, and even some popular (e.g. Gladwell, 2005) understandings of intuition 
have evolved to the extent that recent years have seen a clearing away much of the 
conceptual debris, with a more careful delineation of intuition from closely related yet 
distinct constructs (see, e.g., Dane and Pratt, 2007; Hodgkinson et al, 2008; Hogarth, 
2001).  Conceptual slippage at this stage would be a serious retrograde step (e.g. 
Duggan, 2007) and should be avoided at all costs. 
Recommendation 2, Greater cross-disciplinary collaboration and integration: It 
is clear that intuition researchers in management have embraced the project of 
integration, and thereby have made substantial progress; whether such progress would 
have occurred earlier if management researchers had taken a more holistic perspective 
remains speculative.  What is beyond doubt, however, is that theoretical developments 
continue apace and empirical evidence from within the psychological sciences is 
accumulating rapidly with respect to a wider variety of intuitive processes including: 
implicit attitudes (Plessner, Betsch, Schallies, and Schwieren, 2008), implicit learning 
(Raab and Johnson, 2008), emotion and motivation (Zeelenberg, Neilssen, and Peters, 
2008), individual differences in preferences for intuition (Betsch, 2008), measuring 
intuitive and rational decision making (Koele and Dietvorst, 2009), frequency 
estimation (Haberstroth, 2008), intuition and fast and frugal heuristics (Glöckner, 
2008), different types of intuition (Glöckner and Witteman, 2010), and the relative 
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utilities of conscious versus non-conscious processing (Dijksterhuis, 2004).  Our 
historical review suggests that research on intuition in management would benefit 
greatly through closer cooperation with scholars in the cognitive and behavioural 
neurosciences. 
Recommendation 3, Increased methodological rigour and pluralism: In the 
1990s management researchers devoted considerable effort to the study of individual 
differences in analytical and intuitive approaches to information processing and the 
development and validation of various self-report measures.  Our review demonstrates 
that much of this work evolved largely in isolation from parallel streams within and 
beyond management, an unfortunate trend that resulted in needless duplication of 
effort and the development of instruments of questionable theoretical and 
psychometric merit.  Looking ahead, researchers should aim for greater cross-
disciplinary cooperation, and not over-rely on self-report measures.  Perhaps they 
might consider embracing alternative epistemologies (e.g. phenomenology), and look 
for more creative ways to study intuitive episodes via retrospective and/or in-vivo 
accounts.  Diary methods to capture critical incidents and interview techniques might 
be suitably combined with self-report instruments and neuro-imaging techniques (see 
Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2011).  
Recommendation 4, Closer attention to levels of analysis issues: Collective 
intuition is largely absent from intuition research; there has, with only a very small 
number of exceptions (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1999), been an almost exclusive focus on the 
individual level of analysis.  However, understanding and enhancing the information 
processing capabilities of strategy-making units and organisations (Hodgkinson and 
Clarke, 2007) and institutionalising intuitions (Crossan et al, 1999) requires a 
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broadening of the focus of inquiry to the team and organisational levels in the study of 
intuition as a multi-level phenomenon.  Salas et al (2010) concluded that a deeper 
understanding of how expertise-based intuition functions at the team level requires 
multi-level models of expertise-based intuition, not least in order to understand how 
people communicate and interpret intuitions. 
At the present juncture intuition researchers fortunate to have a rich and diverse 
set of conceptual, theoretical and methodological resources upon which they may 
draw.  History indicates that impactful developments in the study of the role of this 
pivotal aspect of human cognition in organisational contexts cannot, because of the 
nature of the construct, be a reductive project or come from within the field of 
management alone; instead scientific progress is likely to be maintained and enhanced 
from seeking a deeper and wider perspective which acknowledges the potential 
contributions of psychology, biology, philosophy, and other source disciplines.  In the 
beginning a practitioner initiated intuition scholarship in management.  In the end, for 
us as scholars working in an applied field, it will be on the basis of the contribution 
that our research makes to the intuitive craft of management practice by which our 
work shall be judged. 
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Figure 1.  Timeline of selected key ideas in intuition research (authors in brackets; 
date placing approximate, based on date of publication of representative work) 
Intuition research in base/related disciplines  Intuition research in management 
 
 
 
Psychological types (Jung) 
 
 
 1930  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logical and non-logical processes (Barnard) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1940  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bounded rationality (Simon) 
  
 1950  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inaccuracies in expert clinical prediction (Meehl) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Knowing more than we can tell’ (Polanyi) 
 
 
 1960  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implicit learning (Reber) 
 
 
Hemispheric specialization (Sperry) 1970  
Chess expertise (Chase, Simon) 
 
 
 
 
 
Heuristics and biases (Kahneman, Tversky) 
 
 
 
 
Planning-on-left/managing-on-right (Mintzberg) 
 
 
 
Transpersonal, mystical, spiritual (Vaughan) 
 
 
 1980 Human Information Processing metaphor (Robey, 
Taggart) 
 
 
How senior managers think (Isenberg) 
Anti-AI/mind-over-machine (Dreyfuses) 
 
Creative brain (Herrmann) 
 
 
Intuition in organizations (Agor) 
 
 
The intuitive manager (Rowan) 
 
 
 
NDM (Klein and colleagues) 
 
 
 1990  
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory/REI (Epstein) 
 
Global survey of intuition in use (Parikh) 
Emotional brain (Le Doux) 
 
Intuition in management (Cappon) 
Somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio) 
 
 
Recognition-primed decision model (Klein) 
 
Unitary cognitive style (Allinson, Hayes) 
 
 
 
 
 
Intuition in organizational learning (Crossan) 
Adaptive tool box/’fast-and-frugal’ (Gigerenzer) 
 
Taking the mystery out of intuition (Burke, 
Miller) 
Affect heuristic, risks and benefits (Slovic) 2000 Intuition in strategic decision making (Khatri, Ng) 
Social intuitionist moral judgement (Haidt) 
 
Educating intuition (Hogarth; Burke, Sadler-
Smith, Shefy) 
fMRI studies of insight (Jung-Beeman) 
 
Dual model of cognitive styles (Hodgkinson, 
Sadler-Smith) 
Mirror neurons (Rizzolati), VENs 
 
Friend or foe / myth or tool? (Miller, Ireland; 
Sinclair, Ashkanasy) 
RefleXive/refleCtive systems (Lieberman) 
 
Systematic definition, theoretical integration, 
(Dane, Pratt) 
Systematic conceptual clarification, methodological and theoretical 
integration, (Hodgkinson, Langan-Fox, Sadler-Smith) 
Moral instinct (Hauser, Haidt) 
 
Intuitive business ethics (Sonenschein, Reynolds) 
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Disaggregation - processes (Glöckner, Witteman) 
 
Dual-processing in strategy making units 
(Hodgkinson, Clarke) 
Disaggregation - types (Dane, Pratt) 
Unconscious thought theory (Dijksterhuis) 
 
Inductive studies (Lipshitz, Shulimovitz) 
Intuitive expertise (Kahneman, Klein) 2010 Entrepreneurial intuition (Blume, Covin) 
The nature and role of intuition in dynamic 
capabilities development (Hodgkinson, Healey) 
 
 
Handbook of Intuition Research (Sinclair) 
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FOOTNOTE 
1
 The Nobel Foundation’s title of this prize is “for Physiology or Medicine” 
(emphases added) 
